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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
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 In the run-up to a joint trial on a 77-count indictment 
that charged Appellants with operating a ticket-fixing scheme 
in the Philadelphia Traffic Court, the District Court denied a 
motion, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
12(b)(3)(B)(v), to dismiss charges of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 
1349), mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), and wire fraud (18 
U.S.C. § 1343).  Appellants Henry Alfano (private citizen) 
and William Hird (Traffic Court administrator) subsequently 
pleaded guilty to all counts against them.  But now they 
appeal the District Court’s decision on this motion, 
questioning whether the indictment properly alleged offenses 
of mail fraud and wire fraud.1  
 
 Appellants Michael Lowry, Robert Mulgrew, and 
Thomasine Tynes (Traffic Court judges) proceeded to a joint 
trial and were acquitted on the fraud and conspiracy counts, 
but they were convicted of perjury for statements they made 
before the Grand Jury.  Lowry, Mulgrew, and Tynes dispute 
the sufficiency of the evidence on which they were convicted 
by arguing that the prosecutor’s questions were vague, and 
that their answers were literally true.  Lowry and Mulgrew 
contend alternatively that the jury was prejudiced by evidence 
presented at trial on the fraud and conspiracy counts.  
Mulgrew also complains that the District Court erred by 
ruling that certain evidence was inadmissible. 
 
 At the same trial, the jury convicted Willie Singletary 
(Traffic Court judge) of making false statements during the 
investigation.  He claims the District Court made errors when 
                                              
1 Alfano and Hird preserved their right to appeal.  See infra 
subsection I.C. 
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it sentenced him.2  The Government concurs with 
Singletary’s challenge to his sentence. 
 
 We have consolidated these appeals for efficiency and 
have grouped the arguments—to the extent that it is 
possible—by common issues.  We agree with Singletary and 
the Government that he should be resentenced.  We will 
reverse the judgment and remand his cause to the District 
Court for this purpose.  We are not persuaded by the rest of 
Appellants’ arguments and will affirm their judgments of 
conviction.3   
 
II. 
Appellants Alfano4 and Hird5 
                                              
2 Singletary also attempted to join additional arguments raised 
by other appellants, but for reasons we explain later, see infra 
note 33, we focus only on his challenge to his sentence. 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction to review these claims under 28 
U.S.C.§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 
4 Appellant Alfano pleaded guilty to Conspiracy (Count 1), 
Wire Fraud (Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) and Mail Fraud (Counts 
51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56). 
  
5 Appellant Hird pleaded guilty to Conspiracy (Count 1), 
Wire Fraud (Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23) and 
Mail Fraud (Counts 58, 59, 60).   
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A. 
 We begin with a brief look at the indictment’s 
description of the Traffic Court and its operations to 
contextualize the arguments made by Alfano and Hird.  The 
Philadelphia Traffic Court was part of the First Judicial 
District of Pennsylvania.  App. 186 (Indictment ¶ 2).6  It 
adjudicated violations of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle 
Code occurring in the City of Philadelphia, no matter whether 
the Philadelphia Police or the Pennsylvania State Police 
issued the tickets.  App. 187 (Indictment ¶5).  When a person 
was cited for a violation he or she was required—within ten 
days—to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty.  If the person 
failed to plead, the Traffic Court issued a notice that his or her 
license was being suspended.  App. 189 (Indictment ¶ 12).  A 
person who pleaded not guilty proceeded to a hearing with a 
Traffic Court judge presiding.  App. 187 (Indictment ¶ 6). 
 
 A guilty plea, or a determination of guilt by a Traffic 
Court judge after a hearing, resulted in a judgment ordering 
payment of statutory fines and court costs.  App. 188 
(Indictment ¶ 8).7  The Traffic Court was responsible for 
collecting these fines (sending them to the City and 
                                              
6 Philadelphia Traffic Court was abolished and its jurisdiction 
was transferred to the Municipal Court in 2013 by an Act of 
the Pennsylvania General Assembly.  42 Pa.Con.Stat. 
§1121(a)(2) (2013).  The court is now known as the Traffic 
Division of the Municipal Court.   
 
7 Although other penalties are prescribed by the Pennsylvania 
Motor Vehicle Code (App. 188), this appeal is limited to the 
monetary fines and costs.  App. 355. 
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Commonwealth) and costs (which it distributed to several 
pre-designated funds).  App. 188-89 (Indictment ¶ 9).  
Finally, it reported the disposition of each adjudication to the 
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT).  
App. 189 (Indictment ¶ 11). 
 
B. 
 The indictment charged that, at the behest of Alfano 
(App. 193 (Indictment ¶ 25)) and others, the Traffic Court 
administrator and judges operated an “extra-judicial system, 
not sanctioned by the Pennsylvania court system” that 
ignored court procedure and gave preferential treatment 
(“consideration”) to select individuals with connections to the 
court who had been cited for motor vehicle violations.  App. 
196 (Indictment ¶ 31).  The special treatment included: 
  
(1) dismissing tickets outright; (2) 
finding the ticketholder not guilty 
after a “show” hearing; (3) 
adjudicating the ticket in a 
manner to reduce fines and avoid 
assignment of points to a driver’s 
record; and (4) obtaining 
continuances of trial dates to 
“judge-shop,” that is find a Traffic 
Court judge who would accede to 
a request for preferential 
treatment. 
 
App. 195-196 (Indictment ¶ 30).  All of this was “not 
available to the rest of the citizenry.”  App. 196 (Indictment ¶ 
32).  It also alleged that Appellants cooperated with each 
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other to fulfill requests they and their staffs received.  App. 
194-95 (Indictment ¶ 27).  Finally, it charged that  “[i]n 
acceding to requests for ‘consideration,’ defendants were 
depriving the City of Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania of money which would have been properly due 
as fines and costs.”  App. 197 (Indictment ¶ 38).8 
 After extending consideration to favored individuals, 
Traffic Court judges would report the final adjudication to 
“various authorities, including PennDOT, as if there had been 
a fair and open review of the circumstances.”  App. 197 
(Indictment ¶ 34).  Appellant Hird provided a printout to 
Appellant Alfano showing citations that had been “dismissed 
or otherwise disposed of.”  App. 198-99 (Indictment ¶ 42).  
Such “receipts” were not routinely issued in cases.   
 
C. 
 Hird and Alfano pleaded guilty to all the charges 
against them in the indictment.  But, in their plea agreement 
they reserved the right to appeal “whether the Indictment 
                                              
8 An example of the many allegations involving Alfano and 
Hird is:  A.S. requested assistance from Appellant Alfano and 
Appellant Hird on Citation Number P1J0PK568L4 on or 
around February 17, 2010.  The citation charged A.S. with 
driving a tractor-trailer from which snow and ice fell, striking 
vehicles on Interstate 95.  The violation carried a $300 fine 
and costs of $142.  Appellant Hird promised that he would 
“stop all action” on the citation and instructed A.S. to ignore 
the ticket.  Although A.S. did not appear at the hearing, the 
Traffic Court judge (who is not an appellant here) ruled A.S. 
not guilty.  App. 210-12 (Indictment ¶¶ 25-34).   
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sufficiently alleged that the defendants engaged in a scheme 
to defraud the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the City 
of Philadelphia of money in costs and fees.”  App. 355 (Plea 
Agreement ¶ 9(b)(4)).  So they now appeal the District 
Court’s order denying the motion to dismiss, asserting that 
the indictment failed to allege violations of mail fraud and 
wire fraud.  
 
  “To be sufficient, an indictment must allege that the 
defendant performed acts which, if proven, constitute a 
violation of the law that he is charged with violating.”  United 
States v. Small, 793 F.3d 350, 352 (3d Cir. 2015).  We 
assume in our review that the allegations in the indictment are 
true.  United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 583 (3d Cir. 
2004).  “The question of whether the . . . indictments alleged 
facts that are within the ambit of the mail fraud statute is a 
question of statutory interpretation subject to plenary review.”  
Id. at 590 n.10. 
 
 To indict on mail or wire fraud, the Government must 
allege that defendants “devised or intend[ed] to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or 
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises” and used mail or wire to effect 
the scheme. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.  Alfano and Hird claim 
the Government failed to allege that the scheme to commit 
wire and mail fraud had an objective of “obtaining money or 
property.” 9   
                                              
9 In the context of mail fraud (§ 1341) and wire fraud (§1343) 
the term “money” has the same meaning.  The same is true 
for the term “property.”  Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 
19, 25 n. 6 (1987). 
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 The District Court ruled that the indictment 
sufficiently alleged that the scheme “involved defrauding the 
Commonwealth and the City of money.”  App. 20.  It noted, 
among others, allegations that: 
 
The conspirators used the 
Philadelphia Traffic Court 
(“Traffic Court”) to give 
preferential treatment to certain 
ticketholders, most commonly by 
“fixing” tickets for those with 
whom they were politically and 
socially connected.  By doing so, 
the conspirators defrauded the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
and the City of Philadelphia of 
funds to which the 
Commonwealth and the City were 
entitled.   
  
Id. at 18; see also id. at 185 (Indictment ¶ 1).  Similarly, it 
referred to the following. 
 
In acceding to requests for 
“consideration,” defendants were 
depriving the City of Philadelphia 
and the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania of money which 
would have been properly due as 
fines and costs.  
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Id. at 9; see also id. at 197 (quoting Indictment ¶ 38).  
Highlighting the references to “funds” and “money,” and that 
the monetary amounts of the fines are specifically pleaded, 
the District Court cited to a case from the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit which concluded succinctly that 
“[m]oney is money.”  United States v. Sullivan, No. 2:13-cr-
00039, 2013 WL 3305217, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2013) 
(quoting United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278, 280 (8th 
Cir. 1990)).  The District Court was satisfied that the 
indictment alleged enough.  
  
 “Money, of course, is a form of property.”  Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979).  But Alfano and 
Hird argue that the mere mention of money in an indictment 
is not enough.  They point to a string of Supreme Court and 
Court of Appeals decisions analyzing Section 1341 and 
Section 1343 which reinforce the point that crimes of mail 
fraud and wire fraud are “limited in scope to the protection of 
property rights.”  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 
(1987).10  The Supreme Court said that “[a]ny benefit which 
the government derives from the [mail fraud] statute must be 
limited to the Government’s interests as a property holder.”  
Id. at 359 n.8 (emphasis added).  Appellants are convinced 
that money in the form of traffic fines and costs cannot be 
regarded as the Government’s “property” for purposes of mail 
or wire fraud, and they identify two decisions as particularly 
supportive of their position:  Cleveland v. United States, 531 
                                              
10 The District Court cited to a number of cases that came 
after McNally:  Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 
(1987); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000); 
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005). 
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U.S. 12 (2000); and United States v. Henry¸ 29 F.3d 112 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 
 The Court in Cleveland examined the mail fraud 
convictions of individuals who received a state video poker 
license by submitting a license application that withheld 
important information.  Cleveland, 531 U.S. 12.11  The Court 
noted that the video poker licenses were part of a state 
program that was “purely regulatory.”  Id. at 22 (citation 
omitted).12  It ruled that licenses are a “paradigmatic 
exercise[] of the States’ traditional police powers.”  Id. at 23.  
The Court went on to say that the state’s regulatory powers 
involving “intangible rights of allocation, exclusion, and 
control” (which are embodied in a license) are not interests 
that traditionally have been recognized as property.  Id.  
Therefore, even though appellants may have obtained the 
license through deception, this was not mail fraud because the 
license—at least while still in the hands of the state—was not 
                                              
11 The licenses were part of a regulatory scheme that had as 
its purpose to increase public confidence in the honesty of 
gaming activities that are free of criminal involvement.  
Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 20–21 (quoting La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
27:306(A)(1) (2000) (repealed 2012)). 
  
12 The Court rebuffed the Government’s attempts to analogize 
licenses to other forms of property like patents and franchise 
rights.  As for likening licenses to franchise rights, the Court 
observed that the Government did not enter the video poker 
business, but rather decided to “permit, regulate, and tax 
private operators of the games.”  Id. at 24. 
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property.  Id. at 26-27.  It was a purely administrative tool 
used to achieve regulatory objectives. Id. at 21. 
 
 The state responded to the Court’s concerns by 
agreeing that the licenses served a regulatory purpose, but it 
directed attention to the revenue it received from fees 
collected for license applications and renewals, as well as 
device fees.  Id. at 21-22.  It argued that this revenue is a 
property interest.  Id.  The Court was not convinced:  
 
Tellingly, as to the character of 
Louisiana’s stake in its video 
poker licenses, the Government 
nowhere alleges that Cleveland 
defrauded the State of any money 
to which the State was entitled by 
law. Indeed, there is no dispute 
that TSG paid the State of 
Louisiana its proper share of 
revenue, which totaled more than 
$1.2 million, between 1993 and 
1995. If Cleveland defrauded the 
State of “property,” the nature of 
that property cannot be economic. 
 
Id. at 22 (emphasis added).  It concluded that  “[e]ven when 
tied to an expected stream of revenue, the State’s right of 
control does not create a property interest any more than a 
law licensing liquor sales in a State that levies a sales tax on 
15 
 
liquor.”  Id. at 23.13  The money collected from application 
and processing fees was an integral part of the state 
regulatory program and it did not create any property interest.  
See id.  
 
 The purpose of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code 
is to “promote the safety of persons and property within the 
state.” Mauer v. Boardman, 7 A.2d 466, 472 (Pa. 1939).  
Moreover, issuing traffic tickets is a crucial element in the 
enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Code:  it is a quintessential 
exercise of state police power.  Alfano and Hird conclude, 
much like Cleveland, that no property interest could arise 
from revenue generated from the state’s exercise of its police 
power in the form of a traffic-ticket fine.  They see nothing 
but a regulatory program here.  But this ignores crucial 
aspects of the case before us that make it different. 
 
 Simply stated, fees charged to obtain a license cannot 
be equated with fines and costs that result from a traffic 
ticket.  The license fee was imposed, adjusted, and collected 
solely by the state’s exercise of its regulatory authority.  In 
contrast, here the state’s police power is exercised when a 
citation is issued, but this ticket merely establishes the 
summary violation with which the person is charged.  Once a 
person has been charged, it is judicial power (not the state’s 
police power) that is exercised to determine whether the 
                                              
13 Cleveland also held that Government-issued licenses have 
no intrinsic economic worth before they are given to 
applicants.  Id. at 23. 
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person is guilty and, if guilty, to impose the fine and costs.14  
These fines and costs, although specified by the Motor 
Vehicle Code, cannot be cabined as a product of the state’s 
regulatory authority.  They are part and parcel of the 
judgment of the court.  With this in mind, it is significant that 
the indictment does not focus on how the citations were 
issued (which would implicate police power), but rather 
alleges that the judicial process was rigged to produce only 
judgments that imposed lower fines—or most often—no fines 
and costs at all.15 
 
 But this raises a further question:  can a criminal 
judgment held by the government ever be “property?”  The 
Court in Cleveland offered a critique in its analysis of a 
                                              
14 The Traffic Court was not an administrative tribunal.  
Rather, it was part of the First Judicial District of 
Pennsylvania.  App. 186 (Indictment ¶ 2).  See also supra 
note 6 and accompanying text. 
 
15 On this point, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court also 
said the following:  “We resist . . . [any invitation] to approve 
a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction in the 
absence of a clear statement by Congress. . . . ‘[U]nless 
Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to 
have significantly changed the federal-state balance’ in the 
prosecution of crimes.”  Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24-25 
(quoting Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000)).  
As we discuss later, the legal tradition of understanding 
judgments as property is long-established.  Consequently, the 
concern about expanding the reach of federal fraud statutes to 
new classes of property that was present in the deliberation of 
state licenses in Cleveland is not at issue here. 
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different issue (whether licenses were analogous to patents) 
that is apropos to answering this question. 
 
[W]hile a patent holder may sell 
her patent, see 35 U.S.C. § 261 . . 
. “patents shall have the attributes 
of personal property” . . . the State 
may not sell its licensing 
authority. Instead of a patent 
holder’s interest in an unlicensed 
patent, the better analogy is to the 
Federal Government’s interest in 
an unissued patent. That interest, 
like the State’s interest in 
licensing video poker operations, 
surely implicates the 
Government’s role as sovereign, 
not as property holder. 
 
Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 23–24.  Fines imposed by judges are 
criminal penalties that  “implicate[] the Government’s role as 
sovereign.”  Id. at 24.  Judgments ordering traffic fines and 
costs cannot be sold and, in the logic of Cleveland, would 
seem then to have no intrinsic economic value.  Indeed, the 
penal (non-economic) nature of the fine is undeniable because 
the failure to pay a fine can result in the imposition of 
sentences of greater consequence, including imprisonment.  
See Pa. R. Crim. P. 706 cmt.  But Cleveland is not the last 
word.  As we will discuss below, a Supreme Court opinion 
issued five years later, Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 
349 (2005), forecloses the defendants’ argument. 
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 Finally, we note a dissimilarity between this case and 
Cleveland, highlighted by the District Court, on the 
significance of the monetary interest that the Government 
associates with the fraud.  The Cleveland Court regarded the 
licensing fees as integral to the regulatory effort and collateral 
to the matter at hand.  The indictment there centered on the 
scheme to obtain liceneses, and did not even raise the 
licensing fees.  See Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 22.  Indeed, those 
charged with the fraud paid all the appropriate fees; there was 
no evidence that the government suffered any economic 
detriment.  Id.   
 
 In contrast, the indictment here explicitly states that 
the scheme deprived the City and the Commonwealth of 
money, and it describes the object of the scheme as obviating 
judgments of guilt that imposed the fines and costs.  Unlike 
Cleveland, the fines and costs play a central role in the 
scheme as alleged. 
 
 Alfano and Hird next focus on our decision in Henry 
to argue that the Government cannot claim to have a property 
right because the Government never had a legal claim to the 
fines and costs at any point in the scheme.  In Henry, we 
examined convictions for wire fraud arising from a 
competitive bidding process among banks to receive deposits 
of a public agency’s bridge tolls.  Henry v. United States, 29 
F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1994).  Appellants—public employees—
were convicted of mail fraud for giving one bank confidential 
information about bids from other banks.  Id. at 113.  We 
identified several problems,16 but Alfano and Hird highlight 
                                              
16 The Supreme Court had already made clear that “a 
government official’s breach of his or her obligations to the 
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our observation in Henry that the object of the mail and wire 
fraud must be something to which the victim could claim a 
right of entitlement.  Id. at 115 (“a grant of a right of 
exclusion”) (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26-27)).17   Indeed, 
we noted that a bank’s property right to the tolls would attach 
only after the funds were deposited.  Id. at 114.  So the banks 
that lost the bidding process never had a basis to claim any 
legally recognized entitlement to the toll deposits.18  Id. at 
115.  A fraud claim cannot rest on the bidders being cheated 
out of an opportunity to receive the deposits.  For these 
reasons, we concluded that the indictment did not allege a 
scheme to obtain fraudulently someone’s “property.”  Id. at 
116. 
 
 Here, the Government alleged that the defendants 
“were depriving . . . Philadelphia and . . . Pennsylvania of 
money which would have been properly due as fines and 
costs” by making it possible for certain well-connected 
individuals to avoid a judgment of guilt that imposed an 
obligation to pay appropriate statutory fines.  App. 197 
                                                                                                     
public or an employee’s breach of his or her obligations to an 
employer” did not fall within the scope of Section 1343.  
Henry, 29 F.3d at 114 (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25). 
 
17 To assess whether a particular claim is a legal entitlement, 
“we look to whether the law traditionally has recognized and 
enforced [the entitlement] as a property right.”  Henry, 29 
F.3d at 115.   
 
18 They were, no doubt, robbed of a fair process, but we could 
not identify any legal tradition that recognized this 
deprivation as a property right.  Id. at 115.  
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(Indictment ¶ 38).  But Appellants stress that, like the 
deposits in Henry, the indictment here alleged an entitlement 
that does not yet exist because a person must be adjudicated 
(or plead) guilty before they must pay any fines or costs.  
None of the cases directly associated with Alfano and Hird 
resulted in a guilty judgment.  As a result, they argue, the 
Government cannot claim here that it was cheated of an 
entitlement, because they were only fines and costs that the 
people might have owed if they had been found guilty.  
 
 The District Court said it well.  Accepting this 
argument “would permit the alleged conspirators” to take 
advantage of their “unique position” in this case “to enter into 
a scheme to commit fraud and then hide behind the argument 
that the success of their fraud precludes prosecution under the 
‘money or property interest’ requirement of the mail and wire 
fraud statutes.”  Sullivan, 2013 WL 3305217, at *7.  
Appellants cannot rest on the very object of their scheme (to 
work on behalf of favored individuals to obviate judgments of 
guilt and the imposition of fines and costs) as the basis to 
claim that there is no fraud.  Indeed, the not-guilty judgments 
that Alfano and Hird worked to obtain through the 
extrajudicial system were alleged in the indictment as 
evidence of the scheme itself. 
 
Even if some of the cases in the extra-judicial system 
would have been judged not guilty in a real adjudication it is 
(as the District Court correctly noted) the intent of the 
scheme, not the successful execution of it, that is the basis for 
criminal liability.  See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 
(1999) (In the criminal context, the court focuses on the 
objective of the scheme rather than its actual outcome; what 
operatives intended to do, not whether they were successful in 
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doing it.); United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (2d Cir.) 
(“Civilly of course the [mail fraud statute]would fail without 
proof of damage, but that has no application to criminal 
liability.”), cert. denied 286 U.S. 554 (1932).  The indictment 
generally alleges not just that Appellants operated a system 
that operated outside the bounds of Traffic Court procedures, 
but that it did so for the purpose of obviating judgments of 
guilt imposing fines and costs in those selected cases.  See, 
e.g., supra note 8.  Moreover, we note that in one case not 
directly involving either Alfano or Hird, the indictment 
alleged that fines and costs were not just obviated, but were 
actually erased by an alleged co-conspirator traffic court 
judge who ignored the conviction, backdated a continuance, 
and “adjudicated” the person not-guilty.  App. 228-29 
(Indictment ¶¶ 108-113).  This episode serves to highlight 
that the entire scheme was centered on keeping (or taking) 
judgments out of the hands of the Government to prevent the 
imposition of fines and costs.  As a result, Appellants’ 
reliance on our justice system’s presumption of innocence as 
a basis to argue against the existence of a governmental 
property interest is a red herring that is properly disregarded 
here. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the indictment’s 
allegation that the scheme had an objective of depriving 
“Philadelphia and . . . Pennsylvania of money which would 
have been properly due as fines and costs” is not undermined 
by the lack of guilty verdicts.  App. 197 (Indictment ¶38 
(emphasis added)). 
 
 Alfano and Hird next highlight that, in Henry, our 
property interest analysis centered on “whether the law 
traditionally has recognized and enforced [the entitlement in 
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question] as a property right.”  29 F.3d at 115.  Appellants 
assert that traffic fines and costs typically have not been 
considered economic property and are unsupported by any 
legal tradition sufficient to ground charges of wire and mail 
fraud.  As we have already noted we disagree with any 
conclusion that the fines and costs at issue have no intrinsic 
economic value.  But we turn to another decision of the 
Supreme Court that came after Cleveland to address squarely 
whether jurisprudence supports our conclusion. 
 
 In 2005 the Supreme Court reviewed convictions 
arising from a scheme to smuggle large quantities of liquor 
from the United States into Canada, evading Canadian taxes.  
See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 353 (2005).  
The Court noted that the right to be paid has been routinely 
recognized as property, id. at 355–56,19 observing that there is 
an equivalence between “money in hand and money legally 
due,” id. at 356.  Affirming the conviction, the Court said:  
“Had petitioners complied with this legal obligation, they 
would have paid money to Canada.  Petitioners’ tax evasion 
deprived Canada of that money, inflicting an economic injury 
no less than had they embezzled funds from the Canadian 
treasury.”  Id.  It concluded that:  “[t]he object of petitioners’ 
scheme was to deprive Canada of money legally due, and 
their scheme thereby had as its object the deprivation of 
Canada’s ‘property.’”  Id.  Under Pasquantino, then, traffic 
tickets (or more precisely, judgments arising from them) are 
considered an “entitlement to collect money from individuals, 
                                              
19 The Court cited 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England 153–155 (1768), which classified the right 
to sue on a debt as personal property. 
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the possession of which is ‘something of value.’”  544 U.S. at 
355 (quoting McNally, 483 U.S. at 358).20  We conclude that 
a scheme to obviate judgments imposing fines, effectively 
preventing the government from holding and collecting on 
such judgments imposes an economic injury that is the 
equivalent of unlawfully taking money from fines paid out of 
the Government’s accounts.  See id. at 358. 
 
 Alfano and Hird focus, finally, on the role that a 
judge’s discretion plays in the adjudication of a case, 
asserting that the uncertainty this creates about outcomes in 
any given case undermines any argument that a judgment in a 
Traffic Court case can be claimed as an entitlement to 
property.  To the extent that this merely rephrases the issue of 
guilt or innocence on particular charges, we have already 
                                              
20 We also note that Pennsylvania law permits the government 
to remedy the nonpayment of fines and costs as an unpaid 
debt through civil process, enabling the government to 
become a judgment creditor.  Pa. R. Crim. P. 706 cmt. 
(“Nothing in this rule [concerning criminal fines] is intended 
to abridge any rights the Commonwealth may have in a civil 
proceeding to collect a fine or costs.”).  Because of this, a 
separate legal tradition is implicated that recognizes the 
judgment itself as property.  See, e.g., Armada (Singapore) 
PTE Ltd. v. Amcol International Corp., 885 F.3d 1090, 1094 
(7th Cir. 2018).  This long, stable legal tradition of 
recognizing civil judgments for money as property supports 
the conclusion that the fines arising from judgments in traffic 
court cannot be regarded merely as implicating the act of a 
sovereign imposing a criminal penalty.  They can be collected 
by civil process as a debt and are, thus, a property interest.  
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addressed it above.  To the degree that it refers to a judge’s 
discretion in sentencing, as the District Court noted, there is 
no such discretion here.21  The Motor Vehicle Code imposes 
fines and costs for each violation, eliminating any judicial 
discretion in this regard. 
 
D. 
 All of this leads us to conclude that the District Court 
did not err by denying the motion to dismiss.  We conclude 
that, as alleged, this scheme had the objective of preventing 
the City of Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania from possessing a lawful entitlement to collect 
money in the form of fines and costs—a property interest—
from individuals who Alfano and Hird assisted.  We will thus 
affirm the convictions of Appellants Alfano and Hird. 
 
III. 
Appellants Tynes, Lowry, and Mulgrew 
A. 
                                              
21 We question, in general, the relevance of an entity’s 
authority to relinquish a just entitlement or to forbear an 
obligation that an entitlement imposes upon another, as a 
basis to call into doubt the legitimacy of, or the very existence 
of the entitlement.  But see United States v. Mariani, 90 F. 
Supp. 2d 574, 583 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (Discretionary civil fines 
and penalties “may be too speculative to constitute a valid 
property interest.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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 In 2011, the United States Attorney presented to the 
Grand Jury evidence arising from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s inquiry into the Traffic Court.  Appellants 
Lowry, Mulgrew, and Tynes testified and the Government 
brought perjury charges against them for statements they 
made to the Grand Jury.  After Hird and Alfano pleaded 
guilty, the rest of the Appellants went to trial.  The jury 
acquitted Lowry, Mulgrew, and Tynes of all counts against 
them on wire fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy.  But it found 
them guilty of perjury.  Tynes, Lowry, and Mulgrew 
challenge their convictions by raising similar legal arguments 
about the sufficiency of the evidence. 
 As with all challenges to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we use a highly deferential standard of review.  See 
United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (en banc).  We examine the record in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution, and will not disturb the verdict if 
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United 
States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis 
in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979)).  Tynes, Lowry, and Mulgrew argue that the 
questions asked of them at trial were fatally vague and/or that 
their answers were truthful.  As a result, they contend that 
these questions and answers are an inadequate basis for a 
perjury conviction. 
 
 A conviction for perjury before a grand jury requires 
the Government to prove that the defendant took an oath 
before the grand jury and then knowingly made a “false 
material declaration.”  18 U.S.C. § 1623.  But we recognized 
(in the context of a sentencing enhancement for perjury) that 
sometimes “confusion, mistake, or faulty memory” results in 
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inaccuracies that cannot be categorized as a “willful attempt 
to obstruct justice” under perjury statutes.  United States v. 
Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 75 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 cmt. n.2 (U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n 2003).  So we do understand that 
“[p]recise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the 
offense of perjury.”  Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 
362 (1973).   
 
 Precision, however, is assessed in context.  An 
examiner’s line of questioning should, at a minimum, 
establish the factual basis grounding an accusation that an 
answer to a particular question is false.  Miller, 527 F.3d at 
78.  So a perjury conviction is supported by the record “when 
the defendant’s testimony ‘can reasonably be inferred to be 
knowingly untruthful and intentionally misleading, even 
though the specific question to which the response is given 
may itself be imprecise.’”  United States v. Serafini, 167 F.3d 
812, 823 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. DeZarn, 
157 F.3d 1042, 1043 (6th Cir. 1998)).   
 
 Challenges to the clarity of a question are typically left 
to the jury, which has the responsibility of determining 
whether the defendant understood the question to be 
confusing or subject to many interpretations.  United States v. 
Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 (3d Cir. 1977).  Moreover, consistent 
with our standard of review, we will not disturb a jury’s 
determination that a response under oath constitutes perjury 
unless “it is ‘entirely unreasonable to expect that the 
defendant understood the question posed to him.’”  Serafini, 
167 F.3d at 820 (quoting United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 
1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by 
27 
 
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997)).22   On appeal, 
we review every aspect of the record pertinent to both the 
question and answer to reach a conclusion about whether, in 
context, the witness understood the question well enough to 
give an answer that he or she knew to be false.  See Miller, 
527 F.3d at 78.  Our review, however, is focused on glaring 
instances of vagueness or double-speak by the examiner at the 
time of questioning (rather than artful post-hoc interpretations 
of the questions) that—by the lights of any reasonable fact-
finder—would mislead or confuse a witness into making a 
response that later becomes the basis of a perjury conviction.  
Questions that breach this threshold are “fundamentally 
ambiguous” and cannot legitimately ground a perjury 
conviction.  Id. at 77.23 
 
                                              
22 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit underscored 
the high bar this establishes for appellants by noting that a 
fundamentally ambiguous question is “not a phrase with a 
meaning about which men of ordinary intellect could agree, 
nor one which could be used with mutual understanding by a 
questioner and answerer unless it were defined at the time it 
were sought and offered as testimony.”  United States v. 
Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting United 
States v. Lattimore, 127 F. Supp. 405, 410 (D. D.C.), aff’d, 
232 F.2d. 334 (D.C. Cir. 1955)).  
 
23 The rule of fundamental ambiguity is intended to  
“preclude convictions that are grounded on little more than 
surmise or conjecture, and . . . prevent witnesses . . . from 
unfairly bearing the risks associated with the inadequacies of 
their examiners.”  Ryan, 828 F.2d at 1015.   
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 That is the law applicable to the claims raised by 
Tynes, Lowry and Mulgrew.  But, because our review is fact-
dependent, and because each raises some unique issues, we 
will address each of their claims individually.24 
B. 
                                              
24 Adopting the arguments made by Alfano and Hird, 
Appellants Lowry, Mulgrew and Tynes assert that the 
Government improperly charged them with conspiracy, wire 
fraud, and mail fraud. Therefore, they assert, their joint trial 
on these counts of the indictment prejudiced the jury’s 
deliberation on the charges of perjury.  They claim such 
evidence would have been excluded under Federal Rule of 
Evidence. 403.  They also contend that, without a charge of 
conspiracy, the joinder of their cases would have been 
impermissible under Federal Rule of Criminal Evidence 8(b) 
or, at the very least, severance of their cases would have been 
warranted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a).  
Certainly, where there is evidence of prejudice resulting from 
“spillover” evidence from counts that should have been 
dismissed, reversal is warranted.  See United States v. Wright, 
665 F.3d 560, 575-577 (3d Cir. 2012).  But we have 
concluded that the District Court did not err by denying the 
motion, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), to 
dismiss the conspiracy, wire fraud and mail fraud counts of 
the indictment.  Thus, Appellants’ spillover argument has 
been nullified.  Likewise, Appellants have no basis to claim 
that the Court unfairly prejudiced them by not granting 
separate trials. 
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Appellant Tynes25 
 Appellant Tynes claims her convictions for perjury at 
Count 71 and Count 72 lack sufficient evidence because she 
was responding to questions that were fundamentally 
ambiguous.  The perjury charged at Count 71 arises from the 
following exchange.   
 
Q.  In all the years 
you’ve been [at Traffic 
Court]  have you 
ever been asked to give 
                                              
25 Tynes filed a separate motion to dismiss.  App. 291-99.  
The record also contains Tynes’ proposed order to join 
Sullivan’s motion to dismiss.  App. 290.  However, Tynes’ 
motion contains no such request.  Moreover, the 
Government’s response to the motions notes that Lowry and 
Mulgrew moved to join (without argument), and makes no 
mention of Tynes.  The District Court’s ruling on Tynes’ 
motion to dismiss relates only to the arguments she made 
separately in her brief.  As a result, we cannot consider 
Tynes’ arguments on appeal that relate to those raised in 
Sullivan’s motion.  Moreover, since she failed to raise any of 
the arguments she made in her separate motion to dismiss, 
these arguments are waived.  With that said, we will affirm 
the District Court’s ruling on the Motion raised by Sullivan 
and joined by the five Appellants.  Therefore, we need not 
address Tynes’ assertion that the District Court’s mishandled 
her joinder motion because it does not prejudice the outcome 
of her appeal.   
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favorable  treatment on 
a case to anybody?  
 
A.  No, not favorable 
treatment. People basically 
know me. The lawyers 
know me. The court 
officers know me. I have 
been called a nononsense 
person because I’m just not 
that way.  I take my 
position seriously, and the 
cards fall where they may.  
 
App. 255, 5720.26  Tynes contends that the Government 
pursued a novel theory here (applying federal fraud statutes to 
allegations of ticket fixing) and used the vague term 
“favorable treatment” to gloss over its uncertainty about what, 
ultimately, would constitute an illegal act.  She points out that 
the term had not been used before in reference to this case 
and that the Government offered no explanation or definition 
of the term to alert Tynes to the intent of the question.   
 
 Also, from Tynes’ perspective, every litigant 
appearing before a court seeks an outcome that is favorable, 
thus making “favorable treatment” a term that essentially 
referred to “how litigation works.”  She claims that its use 
amounted to a fishing expedition designed to capture unfairly 
                                              
26 We cite to the testimony quoted in the indictment and the 
Grand Jury that was used at trial.  We note that there are some 
typographical inconsistencies between these sources and in 
those instances we have quoted the Grand Jury testimony. 
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the entirety of her conduct in the courtroom.  She warns that 
this is precisely the type of “open-ended construction” in 
questioning that we found unacceptable in Serafini.  167 F.3d 
at 822. 
 
 Tynes makes a related argument against her perjury 
conviction for Count 72.  That conviction is based on this 
exchange. 
Q.  You’ve never taken 
action on a request?  
 
A.  No.  
 
App. 257, 5722.  She maintains that the word “request” was 
presented to the jury as a follow-on to the question grounding 
Count 71, requiring a person to link the term “favorable 
treatment” and the word “request” to make sense of it.  She 
argues that the Government took advantage of the ambiguity 
of “favorable treatment,” forcing the jury to speculate that 
Tynes interpreted “request” as “favorable treatment.”  This 
reliance on “sequential referents” is, from her perspective, 
exactly what we criticized in Serafini.  167 F.3d at 821.  But 
she misconstrues our holding.  
  
 In Serafini, the surrounding questions focused on a 
different topic.  This bolstered appellant’s argument in that 
case that the question on which the perjury conviction rested 
was fundamentally ambiguous.  Id.  The appellant said the 
multiplicity of topics in surrounding questions caused the jury 
to speculate improperly on how he understood the question at 
issue.  We said:  “The meaning of individual questions and 
answers is not determined by ‘lifting a statement . . . out of its 
immediate context,’ when it is that very context which fixes 
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the meaning of the question.”  Serafini, 167 F.3d at 821 
(quoting United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 
1978)).  In the case of Serafini, the context made the 
confusing nature of the question apparent.  The various topics 
in surrounding questions created sufficient ambiguity to 
undermine the conviction.  Id. 
 
 Here, however, even though the terms used by the 
examiner changed, we conclude that the line of questioning—
including both questions that ground Count 71 and 72—have 
an obvious, consistent focus.  
 
Q.  In all the years 
you’ve been [at Traffic 
Court]  have you 
ever been asked to give 
favorable  treatment on 
a case to anybody?  
 
A.  No, not favorable 
treatment. People basically 
know me. The lawyers 
know me. The court 
officers know me. I have 
been called a nononsense 
person because I’m just not 
that way.  I take my 
position seriously and the 
cards fall  where they 
may. Most of the time . . . 
the  people in my Court 
plea bargain. They know 
that most of the time, 
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ninety percent of the time, 
say 90 percent, I go with 
the police officer’s 
recommendation. . . .  
 
Q.  So, in all those years 
no one has ever asked you 
to find somebody not 
guilty-- 
 
A.  No.  
 
Q.  --or to find a lesser 
violation; find a lesser fine; 
anything along those lines?  
 
A.  No. I will say to 
people go to court, go to 
trial  and see what 
happens. . . .  
 
Q.  Ward leaders, 
politicians has anyone 
called you  and said I 
have Johnny Jones coming 
up next  week and I 
would appreciate it if -- if 
you  would look 
favorably on him when he 
comes  through? Has 
anything like that ever 
happened?  
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A.  Throughout the 
years ward leaders and 
people have called all the 
time and asked me 
questions. The only thing I 
will say to them is they 
need to go to court. If you 
think it’s a problem, they 
need to hire a lawyer, or 
make sure you bring all 
your evidence to court. If 
it’s something like 
inspection, make sure you 
bring your -- papers and 
things like that. That’s 
what I would tell them to 
do. I  give advice  that 
way. I don’t know if that’s 
wrong or not, but I do. 
 
Q. You’ve never taken 
action on a request? 
 
A.  No. 
 
App. 528-29, 530; 5720-22.  This broader context would give 
any reasonable fact-finder more than enough basis to 
conclude that the witness knew the point of reference for both 
the term “favorable treatment” and “request” was ticket 
fixing.  In fact, Tynes is asking us to do precisely the thing we 
criticized in Serafini, to lift a phrase or statement out of its 
context.  Serafini, 167 F.3d at 821.  Tynes has not persuaded 
us that the question harbors any fatal ambiguity.  
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 Tynes next contends that her responses to questions 
grounding Count 71 and Count 72 cannot support convictions 
for perjury because they were literally true.  Of course, 
perjury arises only from making knowingly false material 
declarations.  18 U.S.C. § 1623.  Therefore, a witness who 
answers an ambiguous question with a non-responsive answer 
that the witness believes is true—even if the answer is 
misleading—does not commit perjury.  See Bronston, 409 
U.S. at 361-62; see also United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 
1416 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 Tynes argues that, because she regarded the question 
about favorable treatment as vague, she interpreted it as 
asking whether she accepted any bribes in exchange for a 
judgment of not guilty or a reduced punishment.  Her 
response of “no” (grounding Count 71) is literally true—she 
says—because there is no evidence that she accepted any 
bribes in return for giving preferential outcomes in the 
adjudication of some individuals who were cited for breaking 
the law.  Under this theory, the same argument can also 
negate the charges at Count 72 since she says she did not 
accept any “requests” (bribes) in exchange for preferential 
treatment. 
 
 Although the jury is permitted reasonable inferences 
drawn from the record about the witness’ understanding of 
the truth or falsity of the answer, it is not (as we noted above) 
permitted to reach conclusions based merely on speculation 
or conjecture.  See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 359.  Tynes’ 
assertion of literal truth is undermined because the trial record 
supports no reasonable inference that the Government was 
asking her about matters outside of the alleged bribes, nor 
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does it provide any reason why Tynes would interpret the 
question in this way.   
 
Finally, Tynes contends that the evidence was not 
sufficient to support her conviction.  However, the jury heard 
Tynes’ personal assistant, Medaglia “Dolly” Warren, testify 
that she received from personal assistants of other judges 
three to four cards per week requesting consideration.  Each 
card had the name of a person who was appearing before 
Tynes on that day.  She passed these to Tynes’ court officer, 
who was present during the proceedings.  App.  4593-95.  
Tynes also instructed Warren to give similar cards to the staff 
of other judges.  App. 4598.  Warren knew to act discreetly 
when she was transferring the cards.  App.  4599.  The jury 
also heard testimony from those who actually received 
consideration from Tynes.  For example, Timothy Blong was 
cited for reckless driving and driving without a license.  He 
admitted in testimony that he did not have a license when he 
was cited.  App. 3150.  He also testified that he requested 
consideration through a Traffic Court employee (Danielle 
Czerniakowski, who worked as a personal assistant to a 
Traffic Court judge) with whom he was acquainted.  When he 
appeared in court, he was simply told that his case was 
dismissed.  He did not have to say anything, App. 3159-60.  
Blong testified he was told his case was dismissed because 
the police officer did not appear (App. 3160-61), but the 
government produced evidence that an officer was present.  
App. 3193-96.  The Government also showed that Tynes was 
the presiding judge in Blong’s case.  App. 3193.  Richard 
Carrigan—who admitted in testimony that he drove through a 
red light—described a similar experience in which, after 
requesting favorable treatment through Judge Lowry’s 
personal assistant, Kevin O’Donnell, his case was dismissed 
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by Judge Tynes without ever having to say a word.   App. 
3178-82. 
 
Tynes does not challenge any of this in her appeal.  
Instead she focuses on the weight of other evidence and 
perceived gaps in testimony.  We conclude that all of this 
provides more than a sufficient basis to support a reasonable 
jury’s conclusion that Tynes did “give favorable treatment on 
a case,” and did “take[] action on a request.” App. 528-30.  
 
For all of these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction on perjury as to Appellant Tynes.   
C. 
Appellant Lowry27 
 Like Tynes, Appellant Lowry advances arguments of 
fundamental ambiguity and literal truth.  His perjury 
conviction centered on one question and answer.   
 
Q.  So if I understand 
your testimony, you’re 
saying you don’t give out 
special favors; is that right? 
 
A.   No, I treat 
everybody in that 
courtroom the same.  
  
                                              
27 Lowry was charged with perjury in Count 69 of the 
indictment. 
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App. 489.  Lowry attacks the Government’s use of the term 
“special favors” as one with many potential meanings.  
However, as we noted above in our reference to Serafini, we 
reject arguments that lift individual questions or answers—or 
individual phrases embedded in either—from the context of 
surrounding questions that help fix their meaning.  Serafini, 
167 F.3d at 821.  The larger context for the question asked of 
Lowry is as follows. 
 
Q.  So if I understand 
your testimony, you’re 
saying you don’t give out 
special favors; is that right?  
 
A.  Well, I know it 
appears that way; and it’s 
hard  for me to prove to 
you . . .  
 
Q.  I’m just asking, 
your testimony is you don’t 
give out special favors, is 
that right?  
 
A.  No, I treat 
everybody in that 
courtroom the  same. 
 
Q.  You treat everybody 
fairly?  
 
A.  I’m a lenient judge.  
I will admit to that.   
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Q.  You treat everybody 
fairly?  
 
A. Yes, I do.  
 
Q.  And these notices 
that you get from your 
personal or from other 
people, they don’t affect 
you in any way; is that 
right?  
 
A.  Virtually no effect 
at all.  
 
App. 489-90.   
 Lowry’s assertion that the phrase “special favors” is 
subject to many interpretations is unconvincing.  We note two 
things.  First, the line of questioning reasonably supports a 
conclusion that this inquiry referenced conduct associated 
with allegations of ticket fixing.  Second, Lowry answered as 
if his understanding of the question was consistent with this 
interpretation.  He said that he was aware it may “appear” that 
he gave special favors.  He also defended himself by saying 
that such requests did not affect his conduct in the courtroom 
at all.  If—as he says—he understood “special favors” to 
mean fair treatment, his answer makes no sense. 
 
 Lowry next claims that, since the question was 
structured to elicit a negative response, his answer cannot be 
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used as the basis of a perjury charge.  Relatedly, he contends 
that the question was merely a summation of an answer that 
he gave just before this question.  In essence he argues that 
this was a leading question.  We have concluded, in the 
context of a trial, that the propriety of leading questions in 
direct examinations is a matter left to the sound discretion of 
the trial judge.  See United States v. Montgomery, 126 F.2d 
151, 153 (3d Cir. 1942).  We extend the same deference here 
to the District Court’s decision to admit this portion of the 
Grand Jury transcript.  We do not regard the question as 
fundamentally unfair or unclear, or something outside the 
norm of questions typically employed on direct examination.  
For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion here. 
 
 Alternatively, Lowry argues that—if the term is 
understood to reference fixing tickets—there is no evidence 
to contradict his response that requests for special favors did 
not impact any of his adjudications.  We do not agree.  The 
record contains the following testimony.  
 
 Kevin O’Donnell, who was Lowry’s personal 
assistant, testified about Lowry’s involvement with requesting 
and giving consideration.  He said that Lowry made four to 
five requests each month for consideration and that 
O’Donnell transmitted them to the personal assistants of other 
Traffic Court judges.  App. 1854.  Likewise, he said other 
judges transmitted requests for consideration to Lowry 
through their personal assistants.  App. 1812-13.  Appellant 
Hird and various politicians also made requests of Lowry for 
consideration.  App. 1827-28, 1832-33.  O’Donnell said he 
would give the requests to Lowry on the day scheduled for 
hearing on the citation.  App. 1818-19.  The requests were for 
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preferential treatment in the adjudication of particular 
citations:  typically the requests were for “removing points” 
and obtaining a “not guilty” judgment.  App. 1819.  
O’Donnell said he sometimes had to signal Lowry in the 
courtroom to remind him that a particular case was supposed 
to receive consideration.  App.  1822-23.  He testified from 
his own observation that Lowry typically honored requests 
for consideration.  App. 1829.  He also declared if Lowry 
claimed he never gave consideration or asked it of others, this 
would not be truthful.  App. 1813.  The same assistant 
testified that if Lowry testified that he ignored requests for 
consideration, or that he never honored requests for 
consideration, that testimony would not be true.  App. 1855.  
The Government also asked:  “If [Lowry] claimed that . . . 
consideration requests had no impact when he disposed of 
cases, would that be true?”  The assistant responded, 
“probably not.”  Id.  
  
 Another witness, Walt Smaczylo, employed as a court 
officer in the Traffic Court, provided an example of how 
“consideration” worked in the courtroom. 
 
When someone comes in, 
for example, for a reckless 
driving ticket and that 
judge normally comes 
down pretty hard and finds 
that defendant guilty and 
then the same type cases 
come  in and you see a 
defendant walk out either 
not guilty or a significantly 
reduced charge.   
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App. 1912.  The Government asked Smaczylo if he saw 
Lowry preside over such instances, and he answered:  “That’s 
correct, yes.”  Id.  Smaczylo testified that requests for 
consideration were written on small note cards or “sticky” 
notes and that he saw Lowry in possession of these cards and 
notes.  App. 1914.  He also provided a generalized example 
of consideration, based on his observation and understanding, 
in which a reckless driving citation would be reduced to 
careless driving.  In such instances, he indicated that a $300 
to $400 fine would be cut in half.  He said:  “So, that money 
was not collected, obviously, by the state.  If that ticket was 
fixed then I saw it as stealing.”  App. 1919.  Smaczylo was 
asked:  “[I]f Judge Lowry testified at the [G]rand [J]ury he 
didn’t give consideration would that be a truth or would that 
be a lie?”  He responded:  “That would not be the truth.”  
App. 1921.  
 
 All of this testimony provides more than a sufficient 
basis to support a reasonable jury’s conclusion that Lowry 
was not truthful when he responded to the Government’s 
question about special favors. 28 
                                              
28 Lowry points to the cross-examination of both witnesses in 
which they seem to equivocate on some of their observations 
and responses to the Government.  For instance O’Donnell 
stated his view that giving consideration was no different 
from the leniency that Lowry extended to every other person 
who pleaded not guilty and appeared at the hearing.  
However, we do not weigh the credibility of evidence in the 
record.  We only judge whether there is sufficient evidence in 
the record to support a reasonable fact-finder’s determination 
that the record supported conviction of Lowry on a charge of 
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 Finally, Lowry argues that the Government’s question 
sought a dispositive response from him on the charges of 
conspiracy and fraud.  He says an affirmative answer to 
whether he gave “special favors” to certain individuals would 
have been enough to convict him of conspiracy and fraud.  
Thus, he maintains that his acquittal on charges of mail fraud, 
wire fraud, and conspiracy is res judicata as to the perjury 
charges that are based on his answer.  He said he did not 
commit fraud and the jury agreed with him.  Therefore, he 
says, he did not perjure himself.  However, even if we 
accepted Lowry’s characterization of the question, we reject 
this argument.  
 
 First, a jury’s determination that Lowry’s ticket-fixing 
conduct did not constitute wire fraud, mail fraud, and 
conspiracy does not preclude its determination that he lied 
about this conduct before the Grand Jury.  Moreover, as the 
Supreme Court has articulated, a verdict on one count that 
seems to be at odds with another “shows that either in the 
acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real 
conclusions, but that does not show that they were not 
convinced of the defendant’s guilt.”  United States v. Powell, 
469 U.S. 57, 63 (1984) (quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 
U.S. 390, 393 (1932)).  It is impossible to know in such cases 
whether the verdicts were an exercise of lenity by the jury or 
outright error.  
 
 Nonetheless, as the Powell Court noted, any 
assessment of the jury’s rationale for its verdicts “would be 
                                                                                                     
perjury.  See United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 337 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
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based either on pure speculation or would require inquiries 
into the jury’s deliberations that courts generally will not 
undertake.”  Id. at 58.  So, even if Lowry was correct that the 
acquittal is relevant to his response to the question grounding 
his perjury conviction, we are not convinced that his perjury 
conviction is unfounded.  Given the substantial body of 
evidence presented to the jury, nothing here demands that we 
abandon the deference we traditionally give to the collective 
judgment of the jury.  For all these reasons, we will affirm the 
jury’s verdict as to Lowry. 
 
D. 
Appellant Mulgrew29 
 Mulgrew does not argue that the question asked at the 
Grand Jury was ambiguous, he simply maintains that his 
statement was truthful.30  The questions and answers 
grounding his perjury conviction are as follows. 
 
Q. How about your 
personal, has your personal 
received any calls like that 
from other judges, other 
ward leaders that she’s 
conveyed to you, saying 
                                              
29 Mulgrew was charged with perjury in Count 70 of the 
indictment. 
 
30 Mulgrew’s claims are reviewed for plain error because he 
did not make the same argument before the District Court.  
United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 148 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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so-and-so has called about 
this case?  
 
A. If she did, she didn’t 
convey them to me.  
 
App. 432-33 (emphasis added).  Shortly after this, the 
following exchange occurred: 
 
Q. Let me make sure as 
well that if I got your 
testimony correct [sic].  
You’re saying that if other 
people, whether they be 
political leaders, friends 
and family, anybody is 
approaching your personal 
and asking her specifically 
to look out for a case, see 
what she can do in a case, 
give preferential treatment, 
however you want to 
phrase it, that she is not 
relaying any of that 
information on to you; is 
that correct?  
 
A. No, she isn’t.  
 
App. 438.  As to the first exchange, Mulgrew claims that the 
Government’s use of the word “call” referred exclusively to 
telephone calls.  This mattered to him, he says, because others 
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had testified that personal assistants of other Traffic Court 
judges would give index cards to his personal assistant in his 
chambers or robing room containing names of some 
individuals whose tickets were listed for hearing.  Mulgrew 
claims that there is no evidence that he ever received any 
phone calls asking that he act extrajudicially to give well-
connected individuals preferential treatment.  The implication 
is that, had the Government asked him about receiving index 
cards with such requests, his answer would have been 
completely different. 
 As with Tynes and Lowry, our review of claims of 
literal truth drives us to examine the context of the question. 
 
Q.   How about other 
judges, have other judges 
ever approached you or 
called to you or get a 
message to you either 
themselves or through their 
personals saying that 
someone is going to be on 
your list next week or next 
Monday and can you could 
some special way towards 
the case?  
 
A. No, they haven’t.  
 
Q.  Never?  
 
A. No.  
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Q. How about your 
personal, has your personal 
received any calls like that 
from other judges, other 
ward leaders that she’s 
conveyed to you saying so 
and so has called about this 
case?  
 
A. If she did, she didn’t 
convey them to me.  
 
Q. And your personal 
is who?  
 
A. Gloria McNasby.  
 
Q. Have you ever seen 
on traffic court files --You 
actually get a file when 
someone’s case is called?  
 
A. Right.  
 
Q.  So the case is called 
and you get a file presented 
to you; is that right? 
  
A. uh-huh.  
 
Q. Have you ever seen 
any index cards or 
notations on the file 
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indicating that a person has 
called or taken some 
special interest in this 
case?  
 
A. Nope.  
 
App. 432-33 (emphasis added).  The transcript makes it 
obvious that Mulgrew’s singular reliance on the reference to a 
“call” ignores the thrust of the Government’s line of 
questions.  The questions focus on the substance of the 
communications between Mulgrew’s personal assistant and 
himself, rather than the mode of those communications. 
 
Mulgrew also claims that he responded truthfully to 
the second question.   
 
Q. Let me make sure as 
well that if I got your 
testimony correct [sic].  
You’re saying that if other 
people whether they be 
political leaders, friends 
and family, anybody is 
approaching your personal 
and asking her specifically 
to look out for a case, see 
what she can do in a case, 
give preferential treatment, 
however you want to 
phrase it, that she is not 
relaying any of that 
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information on to you; is 
that correct?  
 
A. No, she isn’t.  
 
Q. Wouldn’t you want 
to know it?  
 
A. No, I don’t want to 
know. Then I never have to 
worry about what I do in 
the courtroom.  
 
App. 437-38 (emphasis added).  Apparently focusing on the 
words “see what she can do,” he says that he answered 
truthfully by responding that his personal assistant did not tell 
him that people were approaching her and asking her to give 
them preferential treatment.  But, as with the first question, 
Mulgrew cherry-picks a small part of the question out of 
context, distorting it.  The full text and follow up question 
show that the thrust of the inquiry was whether Mulgrew’s 
personal assistant was informing him of the names of those 
requesting preferential treatment from him.  And Mulgrew’s 
response to the follow-up question —saying that he did not 
want to know so that he did not have to worry about what he 
did in the courtroom—is consistent with one who understood 
this.  App. 438.   
 
We conclude that, ultimately, the evidence is sufficient 
for a reasonable jury to conclude Mulgrew understood that 
both of these questions were focused on whether his personal 
assistant informed him of requests for him to give preferential 
treatment, and that he answered in the negative to both.   
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 Mulgrew alternatively asserts that the District Court 
erred by refusing to admit additional testimony from the 
Grand Jury that he claims is relevant to his perjury 
conviction.31  After the Government introduced Mulgrew’s 
Grand Jury testimony, Mulgrew sought the admission of other 
portions of his testimony.  But the District Court sustained the 
Government’s hearsay objection.  The portion of the 
transcript supporting the perjury conviction is as follows: 
 
Q. [W]hether you have 
ever been asked to provide, 
what I’ll call, favorable 
treatment for people in 
traffic court or however 
you define that, whether it 
would be special handling, 
keep an eye out for a 
ticket, do me a favor.  
Have you ever been asked 
to provide any type of 
treatment like that for 
people in traffic court? 
 
A.   People have asked 
me for consideration, but I 
give consideration to 
everybody that comes in 
my courtroom[,] so it 
                                              
31 We review the District Court’s ruling on the admissibility 
of evidence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Green, 
617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010).   
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doesn’t make a difference 
to me.   
 
 
App. 422-23.  The basis for the Government’s hearsay 
objection to this portion of the testimony was that it raised an 
out-of-court statement not offered by a party opponent. 
   
 Mulgrew first contends that the District Court erred by 
ruling that this was hearsay because it was not offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted.  He says that the testimony was 
instead offered to show his state of mind later in his 
testimony.  See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 
191-92 (3d Cir. 2008).  However, we conclude that it was not 
an abuse of discretion for the District Court to sustain the 
Government’s hearsay objection.  It was reasonable for the 
District Court to conclude here that his response relied on 
out-of-court statements offered to assert his innocence since 
his response conveys a declaration that he treated no person 
different from another. 
 
 Mulgrew also argues that this portion of the transcript 
is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 106:  “[i]f a 
party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, 
an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of 
any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—
that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.”  
Mulgrew maintains that this question and answer provides 
context showing that he did not commit perjury.  He also 
maintains that the “doctrine of completeness” applies here:  
fairness demanded the admission of the statements.  See 
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United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984).32  We 
are not convinced.   
 
 The excerpt at issue occurs many pages before the 
testimony regarded as perjurious.  It is unrelated in the overall 
sequence of questions and to the answers grounding his 
conviction.  Moreover, as the intervening pages suggest, it 
was separated by the passage of time during questioning.  We 
also fail to see how Mulgrew’s equivocation over the term 
“consideration” gives helpful context to his later denial of 
receiving requests for consideration.  For these reasons, we 
conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
sustaining the Government’s hearsay objection. 
 
IV. 
Appellant Singletary33 
                                              
32 “Under this doctrine of completeness, a second writing may 
be required to be read if it is necessary to (1) explain the 
admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion in context, (3) 
avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) insure a fair and 
impartial understanding.”  Soures, 736 F.2d at 91.  
 
33 Appellant Singletary was charged with making false 
statements in Counts 73 and 74 of the indictment.  He states 
in his brief that he ‘joins all arguments on behalf of co-
appellants pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
28(i).”  Singletary Br. 19.  To the extent that he joins the 
argument of prejudice resulting from the trial on the fraud and 
conspiracy charges, we already have determined that the 
indictment was proper and no prejudice resulted from 
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 During the investigation of the Traffic Court by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Appellant Singletary was 
among those interviewed.  The jury acquitted Singletary of all 
counts of wire fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy.  It found 
him guilty of false statements made to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.  At sentencing, over Singletary’s objection, the 
District Court sentenced Singletary using the Guideline on 
obstruction. 
 
 The Government agrees that the single count on which 
he was convicted does not contain all of the elements of 
obstruction.  U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2.  For this reason, the 
Government agrees with Singletary that he is entitled to a 
remand for resentencing.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
judgment of sentence as to Singletary and remand to the 
District Court for resentencing. 
 
V. 
 For all of these reasons, we will vacate the judgment of 
sentence of the District Court with regard to Appellant 
Singletary and remand for resentencing.  We will affirm the 
judgments of the District Court as to Appellants Alfano, Hird, 
Lowry, Mulgrew and Tynes. 
                                                                                                     
bringing these charges to trial.  As for the challenges to 
perjury in Counts 72 and 74, we note that Singletary was 
charged with a different crime:  false statements in a federal 
investigation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  In addition, the 
challenges to all of such charges are inherently fact-intensive.  
As he did not provide a factual basis for such a challenge, we 
regard the issue to be waived.  
